This paper takes a look at the Talmudic rule aka the 1/N rule aka the uniform investment strategy from the viewpoint of elementary microeconomics. Specifically, we derive the cardinal utility function for a Talmud-obeying agent which happens to have the Cobb-Douglas form. Further, we investigate individual supply and demand due to rebalancing and compare them to market depth of an exchange. Finally, we discuss how operating as a liquidity provider can benefit the Talmud-obeying agent with every exchange transaction in terms of the identified utility function.
Deriving the cardinal utility function
The Talmudic rule 1 requires one to store equal amount of goods and money with respect to the market price of the goods at any given time. Let us assume that an agent has initially bought a quantity q 0 of goods at the price p 0 and is left with m 0 units of money. Then we can derive the cardinal utility function u(m, q) of that agent measured in the units of money. First, the initial configuration requires the budget 2m 0 = 2p 0 q 0 , thus we have u(m 0 , q 0 ) = 2p 0 q 0 . Second, having km of money and kq of goods should be exactly k times more preferable than having m of money and q of goods. Finally, notice that the Talmud-obeying agent should always be ready to exchange |∆q| of goods for |∆m| of money (and vice versa) as long as the exchange rate is equal to the ratio between the resulting amounts of money and goods in their possession:
The latter means that u(m, q) remains constant along hyperbolas mq = C. Thus we have u(m, q) = f (mq) for some function f (t). As noticed earlier, u(km, kq) = ku(m, q), hence The resulting indifference map is illustrated in Figure 1 . See also Appendix A.
Supply and demand due to rebalancing
Note that the indifference curve mq = m 0 q 0 is defined in terms of amounts m and q that are in possession of our Talmud-obeying agent, so it cannot be used directly to find the supply and demand curves. Instead, we should consider supplied q s and demanded q d quantities due to rebalancing required by the Talmudic rule when the price changes. Specifically, when the price goes up, our agent is to sell some q s = q 0 − q of their q 0 units of goods, resulting in q units left in their possession. Note that since q > 0, we have q s < q 0 . Conversely, when the price goes down, the agent buys q d = q − q 0 units of goods in addition to their q 0 units and is left with the total of q units. As the Talmudic rule implies m = pq at any given price p, we can rewrite the indifference curve as pq 2 = p 0 q 2 0 and use it in order to obtain the following supply and demand curves:
These supply and demand curves are illustrated in Figure 2 . Notice that due to limited resources q 0 and m 0 in possession of our Talmud-obeying agent, the supply curve has an asymptote q = q 0 , whereas the total area below the demand curve is equal to m 0 :
Figure 2 might look familiar. Indeed, it resembles market depth that is provided by exchanges, when the current price is equal to p 0 . Notice that near p = p 0 , our supply and demand curves behave linearly with the same absolute slope. The similar behavior can be noticed about market depth at relatively stable conditions near the current price. The latter observation about market depth has a rather curious consequence. Namely, we can estimate the budget u 0 = 2p 0 q 0 that is needed for a Talmud-obeying agent in order to provide as much liquidity near the current price as the whole exchange does: dp s dq s = − dp
Operating as a market maker
In the previous sections, we applied the Talmudic rule to infinitesimal changes in price. However, situation is slightly different for any finite non-zero change in price. As discussed in [1, Section 2], the Talmudic rule then implies that the geometric mean of the quantity of goods and the amount of money in possession always increases:
Let us denote the relative differences in utility and price, respectively, as follows:
Then, we can use (1) to calculate the relative growth in utility %∆u after the transaction that corresponds to a relative change in price %∆p, assuming p 1 > p 0 :
at %∆p = 0.
For example, %∆p = 2% results in %∆u ≈ 0.5% . With such a transaction once a day on average and assuming negligible transaction fees, the annual interest rate in terms of our Talmudic utility is about 1.84%. As one would expect, the market maker has to face a trade-off between the frequency of transactions and the utility growth per transaction. In turn, [1] suggests that to find the optimal values of %∆p may not be a trivial problem.
